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This paper evaluates the impact on the bank risk of some control 
variables and the specific characteristics of five domestic banks in 
Korea by using data from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the fourth 
quarter of 2013 in order to test the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy.  Bank risk is measured by credit default swap (CDS) premium.  
In particular, this study focuses on the relationship between bank risk 
and the nominal short-term interest rate that reflects monetary policy.  
As the period of low interest rates becomes longer, banks are willing to 
take greater risks.  This study confirmed that the risk-taking channel 
exists.  This means that monetary policy has a direct impact on 
financial stability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The U.S.A. experienced a recession until the middle of 2009 because of 
the 2007 global financial crisis.  Korea is still experiencing the aftermath of 
that global financial crisis with the movement of macroeconomic variables 
remaining unstable.  In addition, since 2000, the long-term interest rates 
(e.g., 3-year government bond yields), and base rates in Korea have fallen 
steadily with the decline of potential growth.
1)
 
In case of a recession phase, such as that caused by the 2007 global 
financial crisis, monetary policy authorities tend to keep interest rates low to 
prevent an economic slump.  The Bank of Korea has recently lowered the 
base rate to 2% in order to provide support for economic recovery and 
stabilization of the financial markets because of uncertainty in internal and 
external economic conditions.  As such, the central bank provided liquidity 
to the market through an expansionary monetary policy in order to reduce the 
possibility of a recession. 
The profitability of the banks, which relies mainly on interest income, has 
been reduced along with the decline in interest rates since 2000.  Although 
there has been an effort to expand their non-interest income,
2)
 these have yet 
to be effective.   
The risk-taking channel is a transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 
which an expansionary monetary policy (i.e., low interest rates over an 
extended period) affects the risk appetite and the soundness of banks (Adrian 
et al., 2010; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Gambacorta, 2009; DellʼAricciaa et al., 
2014).  There are different ways in which an expansionary monetary policy 
may affect bank risk. 
First, there is the process of changes in bank balance sheets.  In case 
short-term nominal interest rates are cut, there may be alterations in 
                                                          
1) An estimate of the potential growth rate of Korea (Lee and Lee, 2011) shows an average of 
6.3% in 1991-2000, 4.4% in 2001-2005, 4.9% in 2006-2010, and 4.3% in 2011-2020. 
2) According to Annual Financial Statistics in the Financial Statistics Information System 
(FISIS), non-interest income of national banks in Korea reached 7.2 trillion won in 2007 and 
fell sharply to 3.4 trillion won in 2008.  
The Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in Korea 449 
valuations and income depending upon capital market conditions, and this 
may lead to changes in the risk exposure of the banks.  Changes in risk 
perception can lead to changes in the balance sheet. 
Second, there is the risk that an expansionary monetary policy may lead 
investors to seek higher returns through pursuing higher yielding alternative 
assets (Rajan, 2005).  For example, if the risk-free bond yields decline, 
banks are likely to take on relatively greater risk to achieve their target 
return. 
This study uses credit default swap (CDS
3)
) premiums as the risk 
indicators of Korean banks and as the factors affecting bank risk in order to 
identify the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.  One of the major issues 
in determining the risk taking channel of monetary policy is how to separate 
it from other existing routes and appropriate control variables should be 
contained in the model. 
The following question should be considered: Will low interest rates make 
banks take greater risks?  This study is to evaluate empirically whether 
monetary policy affects the risk taking of Korean banks.  While controlling 
the existing transmission mechanisms
4)
 of monetary policy, this study seeks 
to determine the existence of the risk-taking channel.  At times when 
financial stability stands out as one of the goals of monetary policy 
operations, the recognition of the risk-taking channel will provide monetary 
policy authorities with a new perspective in decision-making. 
The second chapter of this paper examines existing research on monetary 
policy and bank risk.  The third chapter describes data used in this study and 
identifies strategies used to set up an econometric model.  Chapter four 
presents the results of the empirical analysis.  Finally, the main conclusions 
are described.  
  
                                                          
3) Default risk of credit default swaps will be transferred to the seller of a credit default swap 
from the holders of the debt securities.  In the event of insolvency of debt securities, Credit 
default swap holders who regularly pay a fee will receive compensation for the face value of 
the debt securities from the seller. 
4)
 This refers to the process by which the short-term nominal interest rate affects a real 
economic variable (e.g., national income, unemployment, inflation, etc.). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The risk-taking channel of monetary policy is associated with how changes 
in the policy interest rate (e.g., in Korea the base rate) affect the risk 
perception and risk tolerance level of financial intermediaries (e.g., banks) 
(DellʼAricciaa et al., 2014; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Borio and Zhu, 2008).  
There are various ways for interest rate fluctuations to affect the risk seeking 
behavior of banks. 
First, there is a yield search path, (Rajan, 2005; Buch et al., 2011).  The 
longer the interest rates remain low, the greater is the risk that investors are 
willing to take.  To achieve higher profits, investors may prefer to take a 
greater risk using various financial instruments. 
Second, in case low-interest rates are prevalent, banks are able to take 
more risk with their valuation, earnings, and cash flow.  The decline in 
interest rates increases the value of the assets and collateral, which can affect 
estimates of the probability of default and volatility.  For example, a rise in 
stock prices can reduce corporate leverage and volatility; therefore, the banks 
have room to pursue greater risk (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).  Also, 
changes in bank default risk lead to financial leverage through balance sheet 
conditions (Adrian and Shin, 2009). 
Similar to the theoretical studies, the existing empirical analysis of the 
risk-taking channel can be split into two categories, micro-economic and 
macro-economic, according to the characteristics of the data used.  Several 
studies (Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010; Ioannidou et al., 2009) show that bank 
default risk increases during periods in which interest rates are low, while 
one study shows conflicting results (Jiménez et al., 2014).   
Also some studies depend on publicly available data and use variables that 
reflect both macro-economic conditions and bank characteristics.  These 
studies show that, in case interest rates remain low for an extended period, 
the risk taking of banks increases (Gambacorta, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2012) 
and the data types used in them are similar to those used in this paper; 
however, this methodology has not been used with the data of Korean banks.   
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Several different studies have attempted to pursue the existence of risk-
taking channels in Korea.  In one study, the risk-taking channel of domestic 
banks in Korea was shown to focus on the evolution of risk over non-core 
liabilities (Yun, 2012) with, for example, an increase in non-core liabilities 
causing an expansion of bank leverage and adding to the risk in the financial 
system.  Also, it was shown that in a case where banks have too much 
foreign debt in non-core liabilities, this can cause sudden capital outflows in 
the de-leveraging process (Shin and Shin, 2011).  In addition, another study 
(Lee, 2011) points out that the leverage of banks has been expanding since 
2005 through increases in foreign borrowing and wholesale funding.  
 
 
3. DATA 
 
It is difficult to measure bank risk, and there is a need to use proxy 
variables.  In this study, CDS was used as the proxy variable and the data 
source was Bloomberg Data, which is only available for five
5)
 domestic 
banks.  
The trends of CDS for the five banks were obtained from the fourth 
quarter of 2005 to the fourth quarter of 2013 (figure 1).  Although there are 
subtle differences in the five indices, they show a similar movement over 
time.  The indices began to rise
6)
 during the third quarter of 2008 and 
reached a local peak in the first quarter of 2009 before declining soon after. 
One feature that can be inferred from the CDS premium data by bank is 
that the premium per bank becomes more differentiated at times when the 
risk to the banks increases.  On the other hand, the difference of the CDS 
premium per bank is insignificant at times when the banks face less risk.  
This study uses panel data analysis of bank risk considering the temporal 
aspects of cross sections. 
  
                                                          
5) Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea and the 
like. 
6) For CDS premium to rise, the likelihood of default of the underlying assets increases. 
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Figure 1 Credit Default Swap (CDS) Premium by Banks 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
 
In terms of the length and scope, the variables on the right-hand side of the 
econometric model are harmonized with the CDS premium.  The control 
variables (the nominal short-term interest rate, nominal GDP growth rate, 
inflation rate, exchange rates, asset prices, slope of the yield curve, etc.) are 
extracted from the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System.  The bank-
specific variables (asset size, liquid ratio, capital adequacy ratio, and credit 
growth rate, etc.) are provided by the financial statistical information system 
of the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). 
The relationship between the quarterly average value of the CDS 
premiums of the five banks and interbank call rates (figure 2) show that, for a 
given time period, the two variables are negatively correlated; however, at a 
time when financial instability is heightened, as the interbank call rates are 
falling, bank risk generally seems prone to decline.
7)
  
  
                                                          
7) The inter-bank call rate from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 was 
respectively 4.06%, 1.92%, and 1.84% on a quarterly basis.  During the same period, 
credit default swap (CDS) values were 414.3, 482.4, and 218.7.  CDS values rose when the 
call rate was declining sharply during the first two quarters.  In the subsequent quarter, the 
call rate fell slightly; whereas the CDS values decreased significantly.  
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Figure 2 The Average Value of CDS Premium and  
Short-term Nominal Interest Rate 
 
Source: Bloomberg, Bank of Korea. 
 
A summary statistics table of the data based on quarterly observations of 
the five banks from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the fourth quarter of 2013 is 
shown in table 1 along with the data source.  The data used in this study 
relates to four commercial banks (Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana) and 
one specialized bank (IBK).  The summary statistics table is based on 
variables consisting of the long panel.  The big differences between the 
minimum and maximum of the selected variables help to identify the 
relevance of bank risk and those variables.  In particular, the short-term 
nominal interest rate has shown a large variation from 1.88% to 5.13%, while 
the CDS premium ranges from 2.57 to 6.35.  Table 2 shows the correlation 
between the measure of bank risk and the other variables. 
Quarterly data are used in this study, although some variables exist on a 
daily basis, such as interest rates.  The CDS premiums and most bank-
specific data are available on a quarterly basis, and also macroeconomic 
variables such as output growth are mainly available as quarterly data.  The 
unit root test results of the variables selected in this study are presented in the 
summary statistics table. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
1) 
(2005Q4-2013Q4) 
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max Unit Root
2)
 Sources 
lncds 165 4.550 0.912 2.565 6.347 0.0001 Bloomberg 
call 165 3.336 1.058 1.880 5.130 0.0312 BOK 
bel_nr 165 16.52 4.370 11 24 0.0000
3) Author’s 
Calculation 
ngdpg 165 5.694 2.468 1.711 10.716 0.0002 BOK 
cpi 165 2.823 1.085 1.068 5.541 0.0231 BOK 
sm 165 –0.079 3.318 –9.490 6.164 0.0000 BOK 
hp 165 –0.044 0.472 –0.725 2.089 0.0218 KOSIS 
fx_dol 165 0.170 4.985 –7.473 13.830 0.0000 BOK 
slope 165 0.759 0.720 –0.120 2.340 0.0201 BOK 
size 165 19.005 0.294 18.142 19.408 0.0000 FSS 
liq 165 0.002 0.074 –0.161 0.298 0.0000 FSS 
cap 165 0.007 0.049 –0.164 0.190 0.0000 FSS 
bis 165 0.005 0.057 –0.242 0.299 0.0000 FSS 
overlend 165 0.108 6.193 –6.190 75.44 0.0000 
Author’s 
Calculation 
lncds = Credit Default Swap (CDS) Premium (Log Value)  
call = Call Rate 
bel_nr = Number of Consecutive Quarters with Short-term Interest Rate below the 
Natural Rate since the First Quarter of 2000 
ngdpg = Nominal GDP Growth  
sm = Quarterly Change in Stock Market Returns 
hp = Quarterly Change in the Housing Price Index (Seasonally Adjusted), 
2013.3=100 
cpi = Inflation Rate  
slope = Government Bond Yield (3-year) – The Base Rate 
fx_dol = Won/U.S.dollar Exchange Rate 
size = Log of Total Assets (Million Won) 
liq = Liquid Debt to Liquid Assets *100 (Log Difference) 
cap = Capital to Assets * 100 (Log Difference) 
bis = BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio (Log Difference)   
overlend = Excessive Credit Expansion (Demeaned)  
Notes: 1) The summary table uses quarterly observations of five domestic banks.  2) The 
panel data unit root test results are provided.  Here an LLC (Levin-Lin-Chu) test is 
implemented.  It is appropriate to perform the unit root test when the panel data is 
balanced and T goes to infinity.  This test assumes the null hypothesis that all panels 
have unit roots.  In this column, the p-values are shown.  If the p-value is less than 
the significance level (e.g., 0.05), reject the null hypothesis.  If that is the case, it turns 
out that the panel is stationary.  3) A linear trend is removed. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
lncds ngdpg cpi size overlend fx_dol hp sm cap bis call liq slope bel_nr 
lncds 1.00 
            
 
ngdpg –0.16 1.00 
           
 
cpi 0.59 0.22 1.00 
          
 
size 0.45 –0.14 0.05 1.00 
         
 
overlend –0.10 –0.02 –0.02 –0.05 1.00 
        
 
fx_dol 0.45 0.05 0.57 0.07 0.00 1.00 
       
 
hp –0.42 0.17 0.04 –0.26 0.07 –0.12 1.00 
      
 
sm –0.42 0.15 –0.42 –0.10 –0.06 –0.64 0.03 1.00 
     
 
cap –0.09 –0.10 –0.12 0.01 –0.07 –0.43 0.04 0.28 1.00 
    
 
bis 0.12 –0.33 –0.02 0.09 –0.17 –0.10 –0.25 –0.09 0.33 1.00 
   
 
call –0.34 0.15 0.32 –0.35 0.10 0.35 0.35 –0.28 –0.29 –0.16 1.00 
  
 
liq 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.05 –0.03 0.05 0.00 –0.05 0.00 0.10 –0.06 1.00 
 
 
slope 0.23 0.24 0.11 –0.02 –0.02 –0.15 –0.19 0.18 0.28 0.26 –0.51 0.12 1.00  
bel_nr 0.30 –0.21 –0.28 0.49 –0.13 –0.20 –0.02 –0.26 0.10 –0.03 –0.62 –0.03 –0.25 1.00 
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The panel data type is different from a usual long panel format because the 
number of the panel (N) is smaller than the number of the time variable (T).  
If the time length is long, the unit root test should be carried out by the 
variables included in the model.  Of the specific unit root tests for the panel 
data, the LLC (Levin-Lin-Chu) method is used.  This method is used 
because the panel data is balanced and, as the dataset has a small number of 
panels and a large number of time periods, N approaches to infinity at a 
slower rate than T.  The null hypothesis of this test is that the panel has a 
unit root.  The unit root test results show that the selected variables are 
stationary.  
 
 
4. ECONOMTRIC MODEL 
 
4.1. Quantitative Model 
 
The quantitative model is designed to determine the factors affecting bank 
risk and describes the behavior of bank risk perception.  The CDS 
premiums
8)
 is used as an indicator of bank risk.  There may be a number of 
indicators that can be used to represent bank risk, and the CDS premium was 
used in this study.  Additionally, the estimated stock price volatility and the 
risk premium
9)
 of the selected banks were utilized for robustness testing. 
The elements to explain bank risk are composed of the control variables to 
describe the overall condition of the economy as well as the variables shown 
on the balance sheet of the bank.  Thus, it is possible to identify the risk-
taking channel and examine the effect of monetary policy on bank risk.  
In this study, a model based on dynamic balance panel data is used to 
describe the risk behavior of domestic banks: 
 
                                                          
8) The only five banks for which CDS premiums can be obtained from the Bloomberg 
Terminal are Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, Hana, and IBK. 
9) Risk premiums are the average additional returns required by an investor as compensation 
for investing in equities rather than a risk-free instrument. 
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3
1 1
,   1,  ,  ,  1,  ,  ,it it it j itjy y X q u i N t T              (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, ,ity  is a risk measure faced by the banks,   
is a parameter, and 
itX   is 1K  vector of explanatory variables which 
consist of the control variables and the bank-specific characteristics.    is 
1K   vector of coefficients to be estimated and jq  is a quarter-dummy 
variable.  
itu  follows ,it i itu     where i  is the unobserved panel-
level effects which may be correlated with ,itX  and it  are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with 
2 .  
Of variables that describe bank risk, liquid ratio ratio, capital adequacy 
ratio, and the excess credit ratio may be correlated with the error terms.  
Those observed bank-specific variables are set to endogenous variables.  In 
addition, the nominal GDP growth, nominal short-term interest rates, the 
won/dollar exchange rate, inflation rate, the slope of the yield curve, stock 
price index rate, housing price percentage change, seasonal dummy
10)
 
variables, etc. are considered as exogenous variables. 
In equation (1), the risk of a bank at a specific point in time and the 
logarithm values of the CDS premium are affected by many variables that are 
listed on the right side of the equal sign.  The short-term nominal interest 
rate represents a change in monetary policy (i.e., inter-bank call rates).  
Control variables, such as nominal GDP growth rate, the slope of the yield 
curve, inflation rate, capital adequacy ratio, exchange rate, and seasonal 
dummy variables are included in order to represent the macro-economic 
conditions.  Also, there are bank-specific variables representing bank 
attributes, such as asset size, capital-to-asset ratio, liquid ratio, and excess 
credit growth. 
Nominal interest rate cuts in the short term (i.e., expansionary monetary 
policy) increase the collateral value of the borrower, thereby raising the value 
of the bank’s existing total loans.  As a result, the risk indicators of the 
banks decline and the estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive 
                                                          
10) A quarter is excluded in order to avoid multiple collinearity issues. 
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sign.  Also, the sign of the coefficient for the number of consecutive 
quarters (bel_nr) in which short-term interest rates are below the natural 
interest rate is expected to be positive.  As the value of bel_nr increases, the 
expansionary monetary policy is operating.  This means that bank risk 
becomes greater as the period of low interest rates increases.  
The sign on the parameter estimates of economic growth is expected to be 
negative.  In case the economy is good, the number of business projects is 
expected to increase and lead to bank profits; therefore, it has the effect of 
reducing the credit risk of the bank (Kashyap et al., 1993).  The inflation 
rate is included in the model to block a path where events that occurred in the 
banking sector affect monetary policy.  In order to maintain financial 
stability, the central bank’s priority is price stability (Bernanke and 
Woodford, 2005).  In case the value of the assets increases owing to 
inflation, bank risk is reduced.  In the opposite case, bank risk increases.   
The parametric estimate for the slope of the yield curve is expected to have 
a negative sign.  The steeper the slope of the yield curve, the greater are the 
bank profits (Viale et al., 2009).  For example, if the slope of the yield curve 
declines, profitability will fall owing to the nature of the transformation in 
bank assets, and this will naturally reduce bank lending.  Thus, an economic 
downturn happens because of a reduction of credit supply to the real sector 
(Adrian et al., 2010).  
Those variables that capture the bank-specific characteristics include asset 
size, liquid ratio, capital-to-asset ratio, and excess credit growth.  Bank 
assets do not have a clear effect on bank risk.  If the expansion of bank 
assets increased leverage, then bank risk would increase (Demsetz and 
Strahan, 1997).  While the liquid ratio and capital-to-asset ratio change, the 
other variables remain fixed.  In the case where liquid assets are in 
abundance or bank capital is sufficiently maintained, bank risk will be 
relatively low.  Excess credit
11)
 growth of individual banks may be 
negligible irrespective of the size of the estimate.  A study (Shin, 2009) 
                                                          
11)
 The gross credit of individual banks consists of total loans, commercial paper (CP), 
acceptances and guarantees, and repurchase agreements. 
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demonstrates that there is no significant relation between traditional bank 
lending and a bank’s risk level.  In the case of Malaysia, the increase in 
gross domestic credit lowers the credit risk of the bank (AlizadehJanvisloo 
and Muhammad, 2013).   
For the purpose of controlling the level of bank regulation, this study uses 
the BIS capital ratio
12)
 under Basel II as a proxy variable.  A rise in the 
capital adequacy ratio, which is enhanced regulation effect, is expected to 
reduce bank risk.  As in the case of the U.S.A., if commercial banks are 
involved heavily in investment banking services, such activities can be used 
to measure changes in the regulatory level.  A previous study (Stiroh, 2006) 
claims that in case banks provide a wider range of services than traditional 
banking services as a result of deregulation, the risk facing the banks is 
reduced owing to risk diversification.  In Korea, the involvement of 
domestic banks in investment banking services is very limited; therefore, this 
study uses the capital adequacy ratio to represent regulatory levels. 
 
4.2. Identification Strategy of the Risk-taking Channel  
 
This study attempts to analyze the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, 
which is distinguished from conventional financial accelerator path 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) such as the financial accelerator mechanism, 
bank-lending channel, and the exchange rate channel. 
The financial accelerator mechanism refers to a path in which monetary 
policy is transmitted through the net worth of the borrower (i.e., corporations 
and households).  For example, in case monetary policy is tightened, the 
collateral value of the borrower will be lowered, thereby reducing the overall 
credit limit; aggregate demand shrinks and production is reduced.  This 
causes the net assets of businesses and households to decrease.  This path 
results in bank loans and investments being reduced further.  In this case, 
banks would enhance the screening of borrowers and this position is likely to 
                                                          
12) BIS capital ratio = (owner capital based on BIS/risk weighted assets)*100, owner capital 
based on BIS = core capital + tier 2 – exemptions. 
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reduce the loan amounts of borrowers.  While monetary policy is focusing 
on the impact on the balance sheet of the borrower in the financial 
accelerator mechanism, an analysis of the risk-taking channel is also needed 
to determine the impact of monetary policy on bank risk levels.  
For an analysis of the risk-taking channel, this study set control variables 
that affect the value of net worth and collateral.  Stock price change and 
housing price change are used as control variables of the financial accelerator 
mechanism.  The corresponding parameters of these variables are used to 
measure the impact of changes in the asset prices on bank risk, given the risk 
attitude of the bank, through changes in the borrower’s collateral value.  A 
rise in asset prices enhances the collateral value and lowers the overall credit 
risk.  
The risk-taking channel is also distinguished from the bank-lending 
channel.  In accordance with the bank-lending channel, a fall in the short-
term nominal interest rate enables the amount of funds available to be 
expanded and, thereby, aggregate demand rises as the amount of loans rises.  
Variables that describe bank-specific attributes (i.e., asset size, liquid ratio, 
capital adequacy ratio, etc.) controlling the bank-lending channel are 
included in the explanatory variables in this study.  The bank-lending 
channel is based on the view that the bank-specific attributes affect the 
supply of bank loans.  A previous study (Kang and Kim, 2010) shows a 
generally negative correlation between total bank loans and bank risk.  The 
bank-specific variables are specified as endogenous ones in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems in the process of estimating a system Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM). 
In addition, the risk-taking channel is differentiated from the exchange rate 
channel.  In accordance with the exchange rate channel, expansionary 
monetary policy leads to a fall in relative yields of domestic assets and then a 
decline in domestic asset prices; therefore, the domestic currency declines in 
value.  However, in a small open economy such as that of Korea, the 
exchange rate tends to be highly dependent on foreign economic conditions. 
In cases such as that of Korea, if the expansionary monetary policy results in 
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an influx of foreign investment, there is also the possibility of a rise in the 
value of the domestic currency because of price rises and increased demand 
for the domestic currency.  
In order to control the exchange rate mechanism, the won/dollar exchange 
rate is included in the model.  The effect of exchange rate fluctuations is 
expected to appear differently depending on the value of foreign-currency-
denominated assets and liabilities of the bank.  For example, in the case 
where foreign-currency-denominated assets are greater than foreign-currency 
denominated debts, a decline in the value of the domestic currency would 
have the effect of improving financial conditions, while in the opposing case 
it would worsen the financial conditions (Bank of Korea, 2012).  
 
4.3. Constraints of the Identifying Strategies 
 
One constraint that might appear in the identification strategy adopted in 
this study is that the situation in the banking sector may be associated with 
monetary policy decisions.  Although a primary objective of monetary 
policy is price stability, the Bank of Korea should take into account financial 
stability in order to achieve sustainable growth of the national economy.   
Monetary policy authorities should consider policy stability in their policy 
efforts,
13)
 and this will affect monetary policy decisions.  For example, 
when the monetary authorities take measures to ensure financial stability 
such a move is included in the error term and influences the dependent 
variable of bank risk indicators.  
This situation can cause endogeneity problems.  In other words, the 
lagged short-term nominal interest rate chosen as one of the key variables can 
be correlated with the error term, making the standard estimators 
inconsistent.  Also, it is easy to increase improperly the size of the estimated 
                                                          
13) The Bank of Korea Act Article 1 paragraph 1 prescribes the purposes of the Act as, 
“establish Bank of Korea and the establishment and enforcement of effective monetary 
credit policy by maintaining price stability and contribute to the sound development of the 
national economy”.  In addition, Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Act states that, “the Bank of 
Korea in carrying out monetary credit policy should note financial stability”.  
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value of the parameter in the quantitative model.  In this paper, a system 
GMM panel analysis is used in order to mitigate these endogeneity problems.  
A system estimator uses moment conditions in which lagged differences are 
used as instruments for the level equation in addition to the moment 
conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation.  
 
4.4. Estimation Method 
 
In case the number of the panel is relatively smaller than the number of the 
time period, asymptotic distribution
14)
 and standard errors of the sample 
applied to a conventional panel analysis can be used (Stock and Watson, 
2012).  In case the length of the time variable is large, additional 
assumptions of normality and the same variance of the error term are not 
required for using t-distribution to obtain the standard error of the panel data 
sample. 
If one is using a dynamic panel model, the lagged-dependent variables of 
the bank risk are on the right hand side of the equation (1).  This means that 
there is correlation between the lagged-dependent variables and error terms.  
In such cases, the two-stage least-squares first-differenced estimator 
(Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) has been proposed to overcome the endogeneity 
problems generated between the lagged-dependent variables and the error 
terms.  The estimation method satisfies consistency (not efficiency) of the 
parameter estimates in case the length of the time variables is limited.  
One of the characteristics of the dynamic panel data estimation proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) is that, unlike the estimation based on 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981), it attempts to use all the information available 
from the samples.  That means that the number of instrumental variables 
produced by the variables listed on the right side of the quantitative model 
                                                          
14)
 In case N is small and T is large, we still use t-statistics and F-statistics.  These 
distributions are valid under assumptions as follows: first, the error term has conditional 
mean zero; second, the explanatory variables and the error terms are i.i.d. from their joint 
distribution; third, the explanatory variables and the error terms have nonzero finite fourth 
moments; fourth, there is no perfect multicollinearity. 
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increases.  In the estimation process, the endogenous variables are 
instrumented with GMM-style instruments, i.e., lagged values of the 
variables in levels.  The included exogenous variables use first differences 
as their own instruments.  In this case, the number of instrumental variables 
increases significantly.  This usually increases efficiency.  
In case the number of the panel is relatively smaller than that of the time 
periods, whether to bring the panel data into the conventional dynamic model 
or not should be checked beforehand.  A Monte Carlo simulation study
15)
  
(Judson and Owen, 1999) was carried out on the basis of a dynamic panel 
data model.  According to the results, first, as the length of the time variable 
increases, estimates based on Anderson and Hsiao (1981) work well.  
Second, computational efficiency is improved by the parameter estimates 
based on the GMM that use a subset of the lagged values as instruments.  
The weakness of the Arellano and Bond estimation is that the lagged levels 
of endogenous variables included in the model do not work well as 
instruments for the first-differenced variables on the right hand side of the 
equation (1).  In particular, it occurs that the level of endogenous variables 
or the lagged dependent variables follow a random walk.  The estimation 
method used in this study is a system GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bover (1998).  The method improves the properties 
of the finite sample, as well as the accuracy of the parameter estimates, 
compared with the Arellano and Bond (1991) method.  
When applying GMM for dynamic panel data, attention should be paid to 
whether the second-order autocorrelation exists.  Only when estimated 
parameters are free from second-order autocorrelation, they maintain 
efficiency and consistency. 
 
4.5. Estimation Results 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether the risk-taking channel of 
                                                          
15) Criterion for evaluating various estimation techniques is unbiased of the parameter 
estimates.  In other words, less bias is considered to be a more accurate estimate. 
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monetary policy exists and to verify whether or not individual banks take 
more risks for time periods when interest rates are kept low.  The main 
results of the quantitative model analysis are shown in table 3.  According 
to the results estimated using the one-step system GMM, a Sargan test 
suggests that the overidentifying instruments are valid.  An autocorrelation 
test does not present a correlation between the error terms.  That is, the 
output does not present evidence that the model is misspecified.  
The analysis confirms the presence of the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy.  In case the other variables remain constant, the estimate for the 
major variable, bel_nr, turns out to be a positive and significant.  This 
confirms that a risk-taking channel exists.  As the period of low interest 
rates becomes longer, banks are willing to take greater risks.  These results 
are consistent with previous studies (Jiménez et al., 2014; Gambacorta, 2009; 
Ioannidou et al., 2009).  
This study considers the nominal GDP growth (ngdpg) and inflation rate 
(cpi) in order to control the domestic macroeconomic conditions.  Nominal 
GDP growth has a negative impact on the bank risk.  Economic growth 
means that the economy is in good shape; there will be improvement in the 
future returns on investment.  This reduces the credit risk of a bank. 
According to the analysis results, a 1 percent rise in the nominal GDP growth 
rate leads to about a 4.5 percent reduction of the CDS premium.  Also, note 
that the parameter estimates of the first and second lagged-variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level.  The overall effect on bank risk of nominal 
GDP growth is negative on the basis of the sum of the estimates of the lagged 
variables. 
While inflation rate (cpi) is positively associated with bank risk, the first-
lagged variable of the inflation rate has a negative impact on bank risk.  All 
parameter estimates are found significant at the 5 percent level.  
Contemporaneously the increase in inflation rate results in higher bank risk. 
On the other hand, change in the first lagged variable of the inflation rate 
causes bank risk to be reduced.  
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Table 3 Determinants of Bank Risk 
Classification Variable Names Coefficients Std. Errors 
Dependent Variable 
lncdst   
lncdst–1 0.818
***
 0.050 
callt 0.183
***
 0.050 
A Major Explanatory 
Variable 
bel_nr 0.021
***
 0.004 
Macroeconomic Variables 
ngdpgt –0.045
***
 0.010 
ngdpgt–1 0.067
***
 0.010 
ngdpgt–2 –0.049
***
 0.012 
slopet –0.109 0.071 
slopet–1 0.310
***
 0.102 
fx_dolt 0.040
***
 0.004 
fx_dolt–1 –0.001 0.003 
smt –0.013
***
 0.004 
hpt –0.210
***
 0.044 
cpit 0.163
***
 0.044 
cpit–1 –0.101
***
 0.029 
bist –0.353 0.523 
bist–1 0.614 0.505 
Bank-specific Variables 
sizet 0.160 0.391 
sizet–1 –1.054
**
 0.428 
sizet–2 1.035
**
 0.484 
capt –0.398 0.501 
capt–1 0.641
*
 0.369 
capt–2 0.209 0.312 
liqt –0.462
***
 0.144 
liqt–1 –0.444
**
 0.211 
liqt–2 –0.362 0.257 
overlendt –0.003 0.004 
overlendt–1 0.004 0.004 
overlendt–2 –0.001
***
 0.000 
Constant const –2.946 2.078 
Number of Banks: 5 
Number of Observations: 155 
Sargan Test (p-value): 0.6237 
AR(1) p-value, AR(2) p-value: 0.0528, 0.1037  
Notes: All variables range between the fourth quarter 2005 and the fourth quarter 2013.  *, **, 
and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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The slope of the yield curve (slope) has a negative impact on bank risk.  
A relatively steep yield curve implies a rise in long-term interest rates.  A 
steeper yield curve increases the revenue of the bank and lowers bank risk 
because of the nature of long-term loans, which are based on funds financed 
by short-term deposits.  However, the sign of the estimate for the first-
lagged variable is positive and a steeper yield curve appears to increase bank 
risk in the subsequent period.   
To distinguish the risk-taking channel from the financial-accelerator 
channel, it is necessary to control the net worth and the collateral value of the 
borrower.  The quantitative model in this study includes stock price change 
(sm) and house price change (hp).  The parameter estimates of those 
variables are all negative and are significant at the 5 percent level.  The 
result is consistent with theoretical predictions.  The rise in asset prices 
increases the collateral value and results in increased net assets for the 
borrower and thereby reduces the credit risk of the bank. 
According to the analysis results, changes in house prices have a greater 
impact on bank risk than stock price change.  A 1 percent rise in house 
prices causes a reduction in the CDS premium of about 21 percent, whereas a 
1 percent rise in stock prices leads to a 1.3 percent reduction of the CDS 
premium.  In an earlier study (Altunbas et al., 2012), a rise in house prices 
has an inverse relationship with bank risk in countries where a housing price 
bubble has not materialized.  In the case of Korea, there is no boom and 
bust of the real estate market during the period analyzed in this study so that 
the relationship between the two variables in Korea can be expected to be 
negative.  
The won/dollar exchange rate (fx_dot) is chosen as one of the control 
variables for the purpose of controlling the exchange rate mechanism.  An 
exchange rate depreciation will increase bank risk and the associated 
parameter estimate is significant at the 5 percent level.  If the exchange rate 
depreciates and there is a net outflow of foreign investment at the same time, 
then bank risk may also increase owing to a decline in asset value.  The 
decline in asset value seems to have a real explanatory power.  On the other 
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hand, for the first-lagged variable, exchange rate depreciation reduces the 
future bank risk, but the relevant parameter estimate is not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
To distinguish the risk-taking channel from the bank-lending channel, this 
study uses bank characteristic variables such as excess credit growth 
(overlend), asset size (size), liquid ratio (liq), and capital-to- asset ratio (cap), 
etc.  When the excess credit growth of individual banks rises, the bank risk 
contemporaneously appears to decrease.  More specifically, in the case of a 
1 percent increase in excess credit growth, the CDS premium is reduced by 
approximately 0.3 percent.  The corresponding parameter estimate is not 
statistically significant.  On the other hand, the parameter estimates of the 
first and second-lagged variables are significant at the 5 percent level.  
The bank-specific variables, such as asset size, liquid ratio, and capital-to-
asset ratio, included as the endogenous variables in the model form inverse 
relationships with bank risk.  An increase in both liquid ratio and capital-to-
asset ratio appears to decrease bank risk.  The coefficient of the capital-to-
asset ratio is not statistically significant at any level and the coefficient of the 
liquid ratio is statistically significant in both the level and the first-lagged 
variable at the 5 percent level.  A rise in bank asset size is found to increase 
bank risk; however, the estimated parameter, contemporaneously, is not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
Finally, although the estimated parameter of the capital adequacy ratio 
(bis), which is used as a proxy variable of the regulatory level, is not 
statistically significant, it shows a negative sign.  However, the effect of the 
first-lagged regulatory level on the bank risk turns into a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at any level. 
 
4.6. Robustness Tests 
 
Robustness tests that either examine specific sub-samples or take two 
different bank risk measures are reported in table 4.  
Results using data from a particular sub-period, excluding three quarters 
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Table 4 Robustness Tests for Bank Risk 
lncdst  
(or lnvolt, 
lnriskpremt) 
Dynamic Panel 
(lncdst) 
(except 08Q3-09Q1) 
Volatility 
(lnvolt) 
(2004Q1-2013Q4) 
Risk Premium 
(lnriskpremt) 
(2002Q2-2013Q4) 
lncdst-1(or lnvolt–1, 
lnriskpremt–1) 
0.607*** (0.055) 0.239*** (0.077)  0.553
*** (0.052) 
callt 
bel_nr 
ngdpgt 
ngdpgt–1 
ngdpgt–2 
slopet 
slopet–1 
fx_dolt 
fx_dolt–1 
smt 
hpt 
cpit 
cpit–1 
bist 
bist–1 
sizet 
sizet–1 
sizet–2 
capt 
capt–1 
capt–2 
liqt 
liqt–1 
liqt–2 
overlendt 
overlendt–1 
overlendt–2 
const 
0.364*** 
0.107*** 
0.056*** 
0.056*** 
–0.025 
–0.126 
0.348*** 
0.029*** 
0.020*** 
–0.086*** 
–0.479*** 
0.084 
–0.092** 
–0.716 
1.240* 
–1.234 
1.967*** 
–0.633 
–0.227 
0.176 
–0.877** 
–0.084 
–0.602* 
0.066 
–0.001 
–0.007* 
0.000 
–4.016 
(0.090) 
(0.010) 
(0.016) 
(0.010) 
(0.017) 
(0.130) 
(0.046) 
(0.006) 
(0.004) 
(0.009) 
(0.110) 
(0.084) 
(0.039) 
(0.584) 
(0.658) 
(0.756) 
(0.476) 
(0.907) 
(0.583) 
(0.344) 
(0.404) 
(0.195) 
(0.346) 
(0.340) 
(0.012) 
(0.007) 
(0.001) 
(2.967) 
0.140*** 
0.005 
–0.040* 
0.024 
0.004 
0.419*** 
–0.128*** 
0.021*** 
0.007** 
–0.063 
–0.002 
–0.113*** 
0.131** 
–0.417 
0.091 
0.336 
0.251 
–0.532 
0.244 
0.246 
0.101 
–0.425** 
–0.484** 
–0.187 
–0.004 
–0.010* 
–0.003* 
0.850** 
(0.025) 
(0.006) 
(0.023) 
(0.016) 
(0.013) 
(0.029) 
(0.044) 
(0.004) 
(0.003) 
(0.039) 
(0.006) 
(0.042) 
(0.054) 
(0.330) 
(0.438) 
(0.782) 
(0.576) 
(0.482) 
(0.218) 
(0.234) 
(0.240) 
(0.185) 
(0.228) 
(0.180) 
(0.008) 
(0.005) 
(0.002) 
(0.336) 
–0.064*** 
 0.011*** 
 0.046*** 
–0.054*** 
0.014** 
–0.005 
–0.004 
–0.001 
–0.001 
–0.008 
–0.010*** 
–0.007 
 0.086*** 
0.032 
 0.504** 
–0.028 
0.197 
–0.116 
–0.102 
0.126 
0.065 
–0.019 
–0.124 
0.016 
–0.000 
–0.002 
0.001 
–0.239* 
(0.022) 
(0.004) 
(0.012) 
(0.008) 
(0.005) 
(0.036) 
(0.047) 
(0.001) 
(0.002) 
(0.012) 
(0.004) 
(0.021) 
(0.013) 
(0.251) 
(0.211) 
(0.253) 
(0.287) 
(0.371) 
(0.177) 
(0.170) 
(0.196) 
(0.064) 
(0.089) 
(0.081) 
(0.002) 
(0.003) 
(0.002) 
(0.139) 
No. Obs 130 266 450 
No. Panels 5 71) 102) 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.9993 0.2283 0.2504 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0534 0.0286 0.0036 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.1449 0.2681 0.3145 
Notes: 1) Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, Korea Exchange, Jeonbuk, Cheju and IBK banks are 
included.  2) Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, Hana, Korea Exchange, Daegu, Busan, 
Jeonbuk, Cheju and IBK banks are included.  *, **, and *** indicate significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  The coefficients for the quarter dummy variables 
are not reported.  The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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(2008Q3, 2008Q4, and 2009Q1) with the highest financial instability index 
as provided by the Bank of Korea, are shown in Column 2.  The sign and 
the significance of the coefficients associated with the short-term interest rate 
(call) and the number of consecutive quarters with interest rates below the 
natural rate (bel_nr) are similar with those results for the benchmark shown 
in table 3. 
The estimation results for the use of volatility as a dependent variable are 
reported in Column 3.  This robustness test is aimed at checking whether the 
outcomes for dynamic panel analysis in table 3 hold or not in case a different 
bank risk measure is used.  Data for the volatility measure are available 
from the second quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2013, thereby 
extending the number of observations in the sample.  The effect of the risk-
taking channel is detected.  The coefficients of the short-term interest rate 
(call) are statistically significant and have a positive sign.  Also, the 
estimated coefficient for the number of consecutive quarters with an interest 
rate below the natural rate (bel_nr) has a positive sign, but is not statistically 
significant.  
A robustness test based on a different bank risk measure, the risk 
premiums of the banks, is shown in Column 4.  According to the results, the 
estimated coefficient for the short-term interest rates (call) is negative and 
significant.  On the other hand, the variable, bel_nr, has a positive and 
significant impact on bank risk. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To examine the hypothesis that expansionary monetary policy increases 
bank risk, this study takes advantage of the resources of five domestic banks 
in Korea.  The results show that an expansionary monetary policy increases 
bank risk as measured by CDS premiums.  This is commonly found in 
existing studies (Jiménez et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2009; Gambacorta, 
2009).  
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The estimated parameters of the endogenous variables, such as liquid ratio 
and capital-to-asset ratio, that reflect the bank-specific characteristics have 
various impacts on bank risk in a comparison with exogenous monetary 
policy shocks; however, of more significance is that, according to the 
robustness test results, a decrease in interest rates for considerable time 
periods increases bank risk.  
The implications of this analysis are, first, in terms of individual banks, 
that banks can manage potential risks through distributing resources 
appropriately by recognizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.   
Second, in terms of the monetary policy maker or regulatory authorities, in 
addition to the traditional mechanism of monetary policy, it is necessary to 
pay particular attention to monetary policy adjustment because the risk-
taking channel affects the financial stability of the overall economy through 
the risk of the banking system.  
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